Normally, the content of a proposition is identified with its truth condition and the content of other conceptual entities, such as objects, are identified with those properties of the object that can make a contribution to the truth of predicates applied to it. Narrow content is that part of content that is wholly cognitive, rather than purely objective. Is there any such thing as narrow content? This is perhaps the hottest debate in the theory of meaning, and is at the heart of the current debate about intentionality.
Belief States and Narrow Content
Article by Curtis Brown which argues that four plausible theses about belief and its relationship to narrow content are jointly inconsistent, and infers desiderata for a theory of narrow content in the light of this.
The Components of Content
Article by David Chalmers proposing an account of narrow content based upon a distinction between notional and relational content. Notional content allows us to describe the `subject-eye' view of the world, whilst relational content allows us to give observer independent analogues of notional content.
Part two of six of an annotated bibliography on the philosophy of mind by David Chalmers.
Last update:June 4, 2013 at 0:13:36 UTC